Author name: 胡思

At first glance, the notion that doctors might spend their entire lives repaying student loans seems unbelievable. Doctors have traditionally been regarded as high earners in a stable profession, and they should, in theory, be among the most capable of repaying their tuition debts. However, a recent report by The Independent highlighted the case of an NHS doctor in the UK who, after years of making repayments, found that their loan balance had not decreased but instead remained at a six-figure sum. This is not an isolated incident but rather a predictable outcome under the current student loan system.

The crux of the issue lies not in personal financial choices but in the design of interest rates. For students in England who enrolled after 2012 (Plan 2), student loan interest rates are tied to the Retail Price Index (RPI) and can reach RPI + 3%. The RPI itself is already a relatively high indicator, particularly when housing costs are included, and it typically exceeds the Consumer Price Index (CPI). When inflation surges, interest rates are amplified accordingly. During the 2022 to 2023 period, RPI exceeded 13%, theoretically pushing interest rates to around 16%; even after the government imposed a cap, actual rates remained high at 7-8% for an extended period.

Doctors are particularly susceptible to this structural pressure. Medical courses typically last five to six years, followed by internships and specialist training, resulting in a longer borrowing period compared to other fields. Interest begins accruing from the first day of enrollment, meaning that by the time they graduate, the principal has already ballooned due to compounding. However, doctors’ salaries do not start at a high level. Junior doctors earn limited pay, and the training period is lengthy, while repayments are only deducted at 9% of income above a certain threshold. For a six-figure loan with a high interest rate, this repayment structure has a minimal impact on debt reduction.

The case cited by The Independent shows that this doctor repaid thousands of pounds each year, yet the increase in interest alone exceeded their total annual repayments, resulting in an ever-growing debt balance. This is not a failure of financial management or a lack of effort; it is a straightforward mathematical outcome: as long as the interest rate remains consistently higher than the actual repayment rate, the debt becomes perpetual.

A common counterargument is that doctors’ incomes will eventually rise with experience, and the issue is merely a matter of time. However, this perspective overlooks a critical point: student loans are not mortgages. Regardless of how high income rises, the repayment percentage remains fixed; simultaneously, higher incomes make it easier for interest rates to reach the RPI + 3% cap. The most crucial first ten to fifteen years often coincide with periods of low income, high inflation, and soaring interest rates. Once this period passes, the compounding effect largely determines the subsequent trajectory.

In recent years, the government has indeed made adjustments to the system. For students enrolling after 2023 (Plan 5), loan interest rates will no longer be based on RPI + 3% but will instead be closely aligned with inflation. Additionally, the government plans to align RPI with CPI after 2030. This means that future students are unlikely to face the rapid interest rate spikes of the past. However, Plan 5 also extends the repayment period to 40 years and broadens the repayment base, indicating that the burden has merely shifted from ‘high interest rates’ to ‘long repayment terms,’ without fundamentally altering the system. For those already under Plan 2, the established interest rate structure and compounding effects mean they can only endure the consequences already set in motion.

Nevertheless, the system does include a crucial safety valve: after the stipulated repayment period, any outstanding student loans will ultimately be written off. This point is significant and often overlooked. It indicates that the government anticipated and accepted that a large number of borrowers would not be able to fully repay their loans, rather than viewing this as default or failure.

From this perspective, UK student loans are not merely a straightforward ‘borrow and repay’ arrangement but rather a hybrid system that combines features of loans and taxation: recorded as loans, deducted based on income, and written off after the repayment period expires. Understanding this is essential to grasp that the phenomenon of ‘increasing debt despite repayments’ is not an individual issue but rather a reflection of the system’s operational mechanics.

Britain is regarded as the earliest modern democracy, not primarily because it introduced elections first, but because it established a lasting system to limit power. In Britain, democracy did not initially focus on who could vote; rather, it addressed a more fundamental issue: how to constrain those in power.

This journey typically begins with the Magna Carta of 1215. At that time, King John, having suffered repeated defeats in war and facing an empty treasury, resorted to heavy taxation and arbitrary confiscation of noble properties, provoking strong backlash. Ultimately, the nobles gathered forces and compelled the king to sign the Magna Carta at Runnymede near Heathrow. This document was not a declaration of democracy, nor did it protect the rights of many, but it established a crucial principle: the king is not above the law. While democracy had not yet emerged, the constraints on power had begun to take shape.

For the next several centuries, the struggle between monarchy and parliament intensified, culminating in the English Civil War of the 17th century. Charles I insisted on the divine right of kings, bypassing parliament for taxation and governance, ultimately leading to his defeat and execution. In 1649, England abolished the monarchy and established the Commonwealth of England, which lasted until the Restoration in 1660—a period of 11 years. This republican experience was unstable, with power concentrated in the hands of Cromwell, yet it left an irreversible fact: a monarch could be tried, and sovereignty was not divinely ordained.

The true anchoring of the system came with the Glorious Revolution of 1688. James II lost the support of parliament and political elites due to his religious policies and authoritarian tendencies. Parliament invited William of Orange from the Netherlands to take over England, and James II fled abroad almost without conflict. William and Mary accepted the throne on the condition of recognizing the Bill of Rights 1689, which clearly limited royal power and safeguarded parliamentary rights in legislation, taxation, and freedom of speech. This nearly bloodless transfer of power established a core principle of modern politics: the legitimacy of government derives from parliament, not lineage.

Entering the 19th century, democracy began to shift from political structures to social dimensions. The Great Reform Act of 1832 abolished numerous corrupt constituencies, allowing emerging industrial cities and the middle class to enter the parliamentary arena. The following year, the Abolition of Slavery Act ended slavery throughout the British Empire. These two reforms acknowledged that political representation must reflect social realities while explicitly denying the legal status of individuals as property, laying the foundation for the modern concept of citizenship.

During the Victorian era, mass movements demanding universal suffrage formally emerged. Known as the Chartist movement, this political wave proposed six demands, including universal male suffrage, secret ballots, equal constituencies, the abolition of property qualifications for MPs, salaries for parliamentarians, and more frequent parliamentary elections. These demands were considered radical at the time, yet their essence was straightforward: if the law recognizes everyone as free, can politics still belong only to a minority?

Although the Chartist movement did not succeed at the time, it provided a clear blueprint for institutional reform. Over the following decades, nearly all its demands were realized, except for annual parliamentary elections. By 1918, Britain granted voting rights to some women for the first time; by 1928, electoral rights were fully equal for both genders. Only then did democracy truly transition from limiting power to widespread participation in governance.

Reflecting on this historical trajectory, Britain’s status as the first democratic nation is not due to its early enfranchisement of the populace, but rather its pioneering establishment of a functioning system of checks and balances. From the forced concessions at Runnymede to the upheaval of the 11-year republic, and finally to the Glorious Revolution affirming parliamentary sovereignty, Britain first demonstrated that democracy is a system that requires effort to achieve and maintain.

The question of whether the United Kingdom should rejoin the European Union has long been considered a political taboo, yet public sentiment is gradually eroding this invisible red line. According to the latest DeltaPoll survey, if a referendum were held today, 58% of British voters would support rejoining the EU. This result is not an isolated finding; it aligns with a long-term trend tracked by multiple organizations, indicating that support for rejoining has shifted from a controversial stance to one that commands a stable majority.

Assuming voter sentiments remain unchanged and only considering demographic shifts, the trajectory becomes quite clear. The first driving force is demographic turnover. The older generation, which tends to support Brexit, is naturally exiting the electoral register, while a new generation, which has grown up post-Brexit and views international cooperation as the norm, is continuously entering the electorate. Current research estimates that, solely due to generational replacement, support for rejoining the EU rises by approximately 0.65 percentage points each year. This is not the result of political mobilization but rather the passage of time itself.

The second driving force comes from newly naturalized citizens. Whether they are European residents with settled status who will eventually become British citizens or other long-term residents who will attain citizenship, they generally hold a more positive attitude towards the EU than the average British citizen. Even under conservative assumptions, this demographic could contribute an additional 0.1 percentage points to the support for rejoining each year. While the impact may seem limited in isolation, the consistent direction of this trend, compounded over time, is significant.

Combining these two structural factors, the ‘natural rate of increase’ for support to rejoin the EU is approximately 0.75 percentage points per year. At this pace, starting from the current level of about 58%, support for rejoining is projected to reach 60% around 2028, a direct outcome of demographic and electoral structure projections. As for surpassing two-thirds (approximately 66.7%), this is expected to occur around 2037, a clear timeline for the medium to long term.

It is important to emphasize that the above projections deliberately exclude any external shocks and merely describe what would happen ‘if nothing changes.’ However, the real world does not operate in a vacuum. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe’s understanding of security, energy, and institutional cooperation. The EU’s collective action capabilities in sanctions coordination, energy policy, and military production have been repeatedly demonstrated, while the UK increasingly appears as an outsider, gradually reshaping voters’ perceptions of the costs of Brexit.

Everyday frictions are also accumulating. Non-tariff barriers and regulatory divergences continue to emerge, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the reapplication of rules of origin, plant and animal quarantine, food safety inspections, and the lack of mutual recognition for industrial and medical product certifications and standards. These obstacles may not appear on tariff schedules, but they directly affect business costs, investment decisions, and employment patterns.

Moreover, a demonstration effect is approaching reality. Iceland is set to hold a referendum next year on whether to join the EU, and if passed, it will illustrate that remaining outside the EU is not the only viable or necessarily successful option. Once such a demonstration effect occurs, its psychological impact on British society often far exceeds the significance of the institutional details themselves.

Therefore, what truly deserves attention is not whether support for rejoining the EU will continue to rise, but whether the political system will choose to ignore this structural curve. The current 58% is not an endpoint but a snapshot of an ongoing trend. Demographic turnover provides direction, naturalization offers momentum, and geopolitical factors, non-tariff barriers, and demonstration effects will only accelerate the timeline. The only remaining question is: Is the UK prepared to confront this reality before public opinion completes its transformation?

Whenever gas prices rise, there is a common instinctive reaction in British society: if there is still gas in the North Sea, why not accelerate its extraction or even legislate that domestically produced gas can only be used in the UK? This argument sounds reasonable and politically appealing, but it overlooks the fundamental realities of how energy markets operate. In fact, even if the UK were to fully push for the redevelopment of North Sea oil and gas today, it would be difficult to have a substantial impact on energy prices.

Firstly, time itself is the greatest constraint. North Sea gas peaked in production over twenty years ago, and what remains are mostly smaller fields with complex geological conditions and high extraction costs. From licensing, exploration, financing to actual production, it often takes five to ten years. This means that new gas fields cannot respond to the current or short-term high energy prices. Energy prices are the result of immediate market conditions, while oil and gas extraction is a long-cycle industry; the two do not operate on the same timeline.

More critically, even if North Sea production increases, gas prices may not necessarily fall. UK gas is not priced based on local production costs but is fully integrated into the European market system. Once North Sea gas enters the pipeline network, it mixes with gas from Norway, continental Europe, and liquefied natural gas, trading at the same price in the same market. Gas itself has no ‘nationality’ and cannot be labeled as ‘made in the UK’. Therefore, increasing local supply does not equate to changing the pricing mechanism.

Some argue that the government could legislate to ensure that local gas is only used domestically. However, this is practically infeasible. North Sea oil and gas projects involve numerous long-term contracts and multinational investments; enforcing a ban on sales would be tantamount to unilateral default, leading to massive compensation claims and legal risks. More importantly, the UK gas system is already highly integrated with Europe, with pipelines allowing for bidirectional flow and the market balancing supply and demand in real-time. Even if legally mandated, it would be difficult to physically and market-wise ‘stop’ the flow of gas. The only viable approach would be comprehensive price controls, but the result would only be investment withdrawal and supply contraction, as history has clearly taught us.

Thus, the notion of ‘energy independence’ is often merely a political slogan. The UK’s energy issue has never been about whether there is gas, but rather about exposure to highly volatile prices. As long as gas remains an international commodity and prices are linked to the European market, the impact on household bills from shifting the source from imports to local production is quite limited. Replacing imported gas with local gas will not automatically result in cheaper energy.

Moreover, climate policies also impose structural constraints. The UK has legislated to significantly reduce fossil fuel use over the coming decades, while new oil and gas projects imply long-term capital investment and infrastructure lock-in, conflicting with decarbonization pathways. As demand gradually declines, new projects may become stranded assets, ultimately bearing risks for public finances. This is not a path to cheap energy but merely a way to postpone the problem.

In contrast, the direction that can truly make energy cheaper in the long term is already clear. The key lies in reducing dependence on gas. Enhancing home insulation can immediately reduce gas demand; once wind and solar power are established, their marginal generation costs approach zero; investments in energy storage and the grid can help stabilize price fluctuations. These measures are not idealistic concepts but have been validated as cost-control tools in multiple countries.

In summary, while redeveloping the North Sea oil fields is not without merit, it cannot address the core issue of expensive energy in the UK. Prices are not determined locally, timing cannot align, and climate risks will only intensify. Placing hope in ‘drilling a few more wells’ is merely a simplistic slogan that wraps a structural dilemma. If the goal is truly cheap and stable energy, the answer can only be to gradually reduce dependence on gas, rather than prolonging its lifespan.