Author name: 胡思

We use its products daily, yet often remain unaware of their British origins. From washing our faces and hair in the morning to cooking, doing laundry, cleaning our homes, and even enjoying desserts at night, Unilever’s influence is likely present. This is not mere rhetoric but a reality: the company has permeated daily life, yet most people do not equate it with a ‘British enterprise.’

Headquartered in London, Unilever is a multinational company listed on the British stock market and regulated by British capital markets. Its market capitalization has hovered around £100 billion in recent years, consistently ranking among the top five companies by market value in the UK, alongside major banks and energy giants. In other words, it is not a marginal old enterprise but a core member of the British capital market.

To understand how Unilever has achieved this status, one must consider its extensive portfolio of everyday brands, most of which people use daily without necessarily realizing they belong to the same group. In personal care, brands such as Dove, Lux, Lifebuoy, Rexona, Axe, or Lynx dominate the bathrooms and washrooms of many countries. In laundry and home cleaning, high-frequency products include OMO, Persil, Surf, Domestos, and Cif. In food and condiments, there are Knorr, Hellmann’s, and Maille. Unilever’s ice cream business is a traditional stronghold, with Wall’s, Magnum, Cornetto, and Ben & Jerry’s leading in various markets. The commonality among these brands lies not in their trendiness or buzz but in their long-term, repeated use once they enter households.

This aspect is easily overlooked because of Unilever’s understated presence. It does not sell technological visions, does not discuss disrupting the future, and rarely becomes the center of political or industrial controversies. Instead, it focuses on low-priced, high-frequency, and indispensable necessities. Products like shampoos, soaps, laundry detergents, cleaning supplies, and seasonings may seem unremarkable, but their demand is nearly constant. This is the fundamental reason behind its ability to maintain a substantial market value over the long term.

In addition to its corporate headquarters in London, Unilever retains several important physical locations in the UK. The most historically significant is Port Sunlight, located on the Wirral Peninsula in northwest England. This site has been operational for over a century and was once not just a factory but a complete corporate community. Today, Port Sunlight remains an important manufacturing and R&D base, rather than merely a historical relic. In northern England, including the Leeds area, there are also production facilities related to food and condiments, supported by various R&D, packaging, and logistics centers that underpin its highly efficient supply chain.

Unilever’s business logic is distinctly ‘British.’ It does not pursue explosive growth but rather seeks predictable cash flow; it relies not on one-off purchases but on long-term habits; it does not need consumers to identify with the company itself, only to have basic trust in its brands. Consequently, it may not shine particularly brightly during economic booms but demonstrates remarkable resilience during downturns. People might delay changing cars or smartphones, but they will not stop washing clothes, cooking, and cleaning their homes.

Because of its highly localized branding, many consumers in Asia, Africa, and even Europe do not care that Unilever is a British company. This, in fact, underscores its success: it no longer needs nationality as a selling point. There are few multinational companies that can achieve this.

Looking back, Unilever may not be the most exciting or talked-about British company, but it is undoubtedly the one most closely aligned with everyday life. With a market value of £100 billion, it has long maintained a leading position in the UK stock market while choosing to exist quietly within every household. This reminds us that a company’s ultimate success does not necessarily come from being seen, but rather from being needed every day.

Matthew Goodwin is a British political scholar who has recently become a significant figure in right-wing populist discourse and is currently representing the Reform Party in an upcoming parliamentary by-election. He has long studied national identity and voter behavior, but his recent public statements increasingly blur a critical line: whether ‘British’ and ‘English’ pertain to legal and civic identity or must be linked to bloodlines, generational continuity, and ethnic origins. This rhetoric shifts the discussion of identity from a systemic issue to one of genealogical scrutiny.

If we follow Goodwin’s line of reasoning on identity, British society would arrive at a superficially consistent yet absurd conclusion: being British or English is no longer merely a legal status but a qualification that requires verification through bloodlines and generations. A person born in the UK, educated in the UK, and legally possessing nationality could still be questioned about their true belonging to this country if they do not have ‘enough generations’ behind them.

However, applying this standard seriously to the UK itself would lead to immediate self-destruction. The first to fail this test would be none other than the current King Charles III. The modern British monarchy has never been composed of so-called ‘native English blood.’ The House of Windsor originated from the German House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, which only changed its name during World War I to align with the political and social climate. The name changed, but not the blood.

Further dissecting King Charles’s lineage makes the issue even clearer. His father, Prince Philip, was born in Greece, and his family, the House of Glücksburg, originates from northern Germany, later becoming central to the Danish and Greek royal families. On his mother’s side, Queen Elizabeth II also traces her ancestry back to German royalty. Additionally, the intermarriages among European royal families over centuries for diplomatic and power balance reasons mean that King Charles’s genealogical network spans Germany, Denmark, Greece, Russia, France, and the Netherlands. Crucially, of King Charles III’s eight great-grandparents, only one is Scottish, and another can barely be considered English; the rest all hail from continental royal bloodlines, almost none meeting the so-called ‘native English blood’ standard.

Historically, no one in Britain has ever denied the British identity of the royal family due to ‘impure’ bloodlines. The reason is simple: British has never been a biological concept. It is a political and legal identity based on systems, civic rights, responsibilities, and constitutional roles, rather than where one’s ancestors lived generations ago. Britain itself is constituted by multiple waves of immigration, conquest, and integration; if bloodlines were used to validate belonging, the very existence of Britain as a nation would be impossible.

As for English, the controversy is even more bizarre. Britain is a country composed of four nations: English, Welsh, Scottish, and Northern Irish. Normally, if a person is British, they would naturally correspond to one of these identities. However, Reform Party member Suella Braverman has stated that even though she was born in Britain, she does not describe herself as English because her family has not been ‘generations in England,’ only identifying as British. This statement effectively transforms English from a geographical and cultural identity into a qualification based on deep genealogical thresholds.

The greatest problem with Goodwin’s narrative is that it undermines the fundamental logic of modern nationhood. Once national identity becomes a contest of bloodlines, the boundaries will continually narrow, leaving some forever deemed ‘not pure’ and others ‘not qualified.’ And when even King Charles fails this standard, it clearly indicates that the issue lies not with individuals but with the standards themselves.

Thus, the question ‘Is the British King not British?’ is not a provocation but a mirror reflecting absurdity. What it reveals is not the royal bloodline but an attempt to redefine the nation through the lens of genealogy.

Premier Inn’s strength lies not in what it does, but in what it resolutely chooses not to do. It does not pursue design flair, boast local characteristics, or attempt to package accommodation as an experience. Instead, it focuses on one thing: no matter where you stay, the feeling is the same and sufficiently good.

The core competitive advantage of Premier Inn is its high degree of standardization. Upon entering any Premier Inn, you hardly need to readjust. The firmness of the bed, the height of the pillows, room soundproofing, lighting brightness, and bathroom configuration all fall within familiar parameters. It may not dazzle you, but it rarely disappoints. For frequent business travelers, this is not mediocrity but efficiency; for ordinary travelers, it is a rare sense of reassurance.

This uniformity is not a natural occurrence but the result of long-term management choices. Unlike many hotel brands that heavily rely on franchising, Premier Inn primarily operates its own properties, tightly controlling design, operations, and service details. The result is that each hotel resembles a replica under the same system. Standardization is not about cost-cutting; it is about reducing variables. When customers book a room, they are not gambling on luck but making a low-risk decision.

More importantly, Premier Inn has a very clear boundary for what constitutes ‘sufficiently good.’ It never pretends to be a luxury hotel, nor does it attempt to attract guests with a cheap version of opulence. It understands that most people need just three things for an overnight stay: cleanliness, quiet, and a good night’s sleep. Consequently, all resources are allocated to beds, soundproofing, and cleanliness, while everything else is kept to a minimum. By not being greedy, the standards can be maintained over the long term.

This also explains why the Premier Inn experience is often more stable than that of many ‘higher-star’ hotels. The latter may have more lavish decor, but quality can fluctuate significantly; renovations today may lead to discrepancies tomorrow. Premier Inn, on the other hand, chooses to minimize change and perfect the art of ‘not making mistakes.’ In the hotel industry, this is more challenging than innovation.

At this point, one cannot help but feel a twinge of regret: there is almost no equivalent presence on the European continent.

Of course, France has Ibis, Germany has various budget chains, and there are plenty of options, but very few brands can provide the same consistent, predictable experience across cities and regions. The European hotel market is highly fragmented, with historical buildings, independent owners, and a plethora of franchising models. While styles may vary, certainty is low. You might stay at a uniquely charming hotel or end up with a dud, entirely by chance.

In contrast, Premier Inn has nearly perfected the market for ‘standardized accommodation’ in the UK. Its success is not dramatic, nor can it be described as romantic, but it is highly persuasive. In an era where everyone seeks differentiation, it demonstrates that for most people, the most precious aspect of overnight travel is not surprise, but certainty.

The UK government is conducting a public consultation on the “Earned Settlement” system. This represents a significant directional shift: permanent residency is no longer merely a matter of time, but is now subject to multiple qualifying conditions. In a liberal democratic society, failing to express an opinion effectively amounts to tacit approval of policy directions.

First, let us address a crucial fact that many still overlook: it is far from sufficient for just one person to fill out the form. This consultation is not counted by “families” but rather by “individuals.” When analyzing responses, the government will tally the number of respondents, individual positions, and group distributions. Therefore, not only should you fill it out yourself, but you should also actively remind and encourage all household members to complete their own forms. Each additional response has the potential to influence the final policy direction and implementation.

It is important to note a technical issue that may deter many: the consultation system prevents duplicate submissions based on IP addresses. In other words, if someone else in your household has already filled it out, you may find the system rejecting your attempt to submit again. The solution is quite simple: switch to mobile data, use public Wi-Fi, or connect through a VPN.

In my own completed questionnaire, I clearly stated my position: holders of the BN(O) visa should be entirely exempt from this policy change, with treatment aligned with the EU Settlement Scheme. European citizens, who are not UK nationals, have received exemptions; conversely, Hong Kongers moving to the UK, who were born British and colonial citizens but have since been stripped of that status, are now treated worse than foreign nationals. This is an indefensible policy choice.

For Hong Kong residents, even though BN(O) holders can nominally apply for permanent residency after five years, if they are simultaneously required to demonstrate English proficiency at the B2 level and meet an annual salary threshold of £12,570, many families will find members unable to obtain settled status. This includes newly adult children, homemakers caring for young and elderly family members, and retirees living on passive income. This is not an optimization of the system; it is akin to adding hurdles at the finish line, effectively moving the goalposts at the last moment.

Please spread this message. Share this article with friends, family groups, alumni associations, community groups, and on WhatsApp or Telegram, reminding them that not only should they fill it out, but each family member should do so individually. The weight of policy comes from the accumulation of numbers; this time, the more voices there are, the greater the space for change.

Silence will not bring stability; only speaking out can change policy and create the possibility of building a better home in the UK.

Whenever the government supports renewable energy or energy transition, opponents often present a seemingly pragmatic argument: without subsidies, the market simply would not budge. This argument assumes that the energy market is a neutral space that has only recently been distorted by policy. In fact, the opposite is true. At least in the UK, the energy sector has long existed under institutional protection, with the largest, most enduring, and riskiest support directed precisely at fossil fuels.

Consider the much-discussed windfall tax. In response to soaring energy prices, the UK government introduced a windfall tax on North Sea oil and gas, raising the nominal marginal tax rate to over 75%. On the surface, this appears to be a measure to tax the ‘windfall’ profits of oil and gas companies; however, the tax system simultaneously includes investment allowances, creating a dual policy signal. The government’s official statement upon its introduction was that, with an 80% investment allowance, companies could save approximately 91 pence in taxes for every pound invested in qualifying oil and gas projects. In other words, the so-called windfall tax does not merely recapture excess profits but instead creates a clear tax reduction pathway for continued drilling through the tax system.

More significantly, the retirement arrangements and the lack of pre-funded guarantees in the system design have long-term implications. North Sea oil and gas facilities must eventually be decommissioned, cleaned up, and the seabed restored, which entails a substantial and unavoidable cost. Recent official estimates indicate that the total cost of decommissioning remaining oil and gas facilities on the UK continental shelf is approximately £44 billion, with around £27 billion needed within the next decade. Under the current tax system, decommissioning expenditures typically qualify for about 40% tax relief or guarantees. In other words, while oil wells are operational and profitable, the profits primarily accrue to private investors; once they enter a phase of no profitability, with only cleanup responsibilities remaining, approximately 40% of the costs are borne by taxpayers.

Crucially, this system does not require companies to pre-fund their decommissioning liabilities at the outset of extraction. The UK has not enforced the same level of obligation on oil and gas projects to establish comprehensive, fully-funded decommissioning funds or guarantees, effectively making the government an invisible guarantor. This starkly contrasts with other high-risk industries. For instance, nuclear energy operators are generally required to establish decommissioning funds during their operational period, locking in future dismantling and cleanup costs to ensure that funds are available even if operators exit later. In contrast, the oil and gas sector operates more on a ‘extract first, clean up later’ model, postponing and partially transferring the most expensive and uncertain tail risks to the public, systematically lowering capital costs.

In addition to the windfall tax and decommissioning arrangements, the oil and gas industry benefits from a suite of less-discussed but equally important tax and institutional advantages. North Sea oil and gas are subject to a distinct circular tax regime, with highly specialized rules that make the return environment more predictable for investors; capital expenditures can be reflected more quickly for tax purposes, enhancing project present value; losses can be managed under the system across periods, improving cash flow; coupled with the government’s long-term emphasis on tax stability, market pricing of policy risk is often depressed. While these arrangements may seem like mere technical details when viewed individually, collectively they significantly enhance the attractiveness of fossil fuel investments.

The disparity between these institutional supports and the support for renewable energy is stark. Household-level clean energy policies, whether through tax exemptions or subsidies, typically have an annual impact in the hundreds of millions of pounds, with clear budgets that can be tightened or terminated year by year, designed to phase out as technology matures. In contrast, support for fossil fuels is concentrated on the industry’s most expensive, uncertain, and unavoidable tail costs, lacking the same clear exit mechanisms. The two are asymmetrical in terms of both magnitude and risk nature.

Thus, to say that ‘without subsidies, no one would be willing to transition to energy’ is to confuse cause and effect. The market’s long-standing willingness to invest in fossil fuels is not due to its inherent competitiveness, but rather because the government has already assumed the largest and most difficult-to-price risks for it. The so-called windfall tax has not altered this structure; it merely recaptures some cash flow during high oil price years while embedding the incentive to continue extraction into the system.

Moreover, this is not just a UK issue. Globally, the scale of fossil fuel subsidies is even more staggering. According to the International Monetary Fund’s broad definition, which includes direct subsidies, tax breaks, price distortions, and unaccounted environmental and health costs, global support for fossil fuels in 2022 was approximately $7 trillion, accounting for about 7% of global GDP. In this context, portraying limited, phasing-out energy transition support as market intervention while ignoring the long-term underpinning of fossil fuels is a form of selective blindness.

The real discussion should never be whether the government should intervene in the energy market, but rather the direction and scale of that intervention. The energy transition is not about subsidizing energy for the first time; it is about attempting for the first time to gradually shift support from an industry that is known to be phasing out but still protected by the system, towards options that better align with long-term public interests. If we cannot even acknowledge this reality, then the assertion that ‘without subsidies, no one would be willing to transition’ is fundamentally untenable.