Author name: 胡思

In the political landscape of the United Kingdom, London has never been the sole centre. At the eastern end of Edinburgh, beneath Arthur’s Seat and opposite Holyrood Palace, stands a building that is bizarre in shape, fragmented in lines, yet highly symbolic. It quietly embodies Scotland’s three-century quest for ‘devolution’. This is not an ordinary local council; it is a constitutionally recognised national parliament—the Scottish Parliament.

Scotland’s incorporation into the United Kingdom was not an overnight affair. In 1603, King James VI of Scotland ascended to the English throne, forming a ‘Union of the Crowns’, while both countries retained their own parliaments and legal systems. The true merger occurred in 1707 with the passage of the Acts of Union, which merged the Scottish and English parliaments into the Parliament of Great Britain, centralising sovereignty in Westminster. Although Scotland retained its legal system, church, and education system, political decision-making power was removed from Edinburgh. This state of ‘retained institutions, withdrawn power’ created a sense of unease for the next three centuries.

By the end of the 20th century, this tension was finally addressed. In 1997, the Labour government held a referendum asking whether Scotland should establish a devolved parliament and grant it limited tax powers. The results were clear and emphatic: over 70% supported the establishment of a parliament, and nearly 60% backed tax powers. The following year, the Scotland Act was passed, and in 1999, the Scottish Parliament officially returned to Edinburgh. This was not independence, but ‘devolution’—a system that acknowledges the reality of multi-layered governance within a single sovereign state.

The logic of power in the Scottish Parliament is fundamentally different from that of local governments in England. It operates not on a ‘central grant of permissions’ basis, but rather on the principle that ‘everything is devolved except reserved matters’. Reserved matters include core sovereign domains such as foreign affairs, defence, immigration, macroeconomics, and monetary policy; all other areas, such as education, healthcare, transport, housing, local government, environment, and criminal justice, are legislated and executed by Scotland itself. This has enabled Scotland to implement free university education, prescription-free medications, and a public health and energy policy distinct from that of England. This is not symbolic autonomy, but substantive governance.

The institution that embodies this system is a building that also rejects tradition. The Scottish Parliament building, designed by Spanish architect Enric Miralles, was inaugurated in 2004. It lacks grand domes and classical colonnades, instead featuring an asymmetric structure, fragmented lines, and a mix of wood and stone. The exterior’s ‘panels’ have been described as inverted boats and abstract human figures, symbolising the people; the entire building opens up to the city rather than towering over it. Critics have labelled it expensive, chaotic, and difficult to understand, but like Scotland’s constitutional status, it was never intended to please those accustomed to simple answers.

This parliament is not out of reach. It has long offered free tours led by trained guides who explain the workings of the parliament, the architectural philosophy, and the political context. Visitors can enter the debating chamber, sit in the public gallery, and observe how a devolved government discusses public affairs up close. These tours are not merely sightseeing; they serve as a concrete and honest form of civic education. For anyone concerned about the future of the UK and how ‘devolution’ and ‘unity’ can coexist, spending an hour here is worthwhile.

The Scottish Parliament reminds us that the UK is not a nation of a single rhythm, but a composite upheld by historical compromises. Power is not merely concentrated or fragmented; there remains space for institutional design in between. The issue is not whether the system is perfect, but whether it allows different regions to respond to their own issues in their own ways. This building stands at the foot of a hill—not high, but very real.

Recently, a term that had been deliberately set aside after Brexit has resurfaced in British politics: customs union. Health Secretary Wes Streeting publicly stated that the UK should no longer consider rejoining the EU customs union as a taboo. This remark is particularly striking as it exposes a harsh reality: under the Labour Party’s current three red lines, the institutional friction between the UK and the EU cannot be genuinely repaired.

This is not the first time senior Labour figures have signaled a similar message. Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Secretary David Lammy has indicated that establishing closer economic ties with the EU is a pragmatic choice. He specifically mentioned Turkey as an example: although Turkey is not an EU member, it is within the customs union and ‘seems to be benefiting from it, with its economy continuing to grow.’ The implication here is quite clear.

Many still question: Did not the UK sign a free trade agreement with the EU? The issue lies precisely here: free trade agreements address ‘whether there are tariffs’ but do not resolve ‘how to cross borders.’ Rules of origin, repeated customs declarations, compliance documents, and border checks create a set of invisible yet costly non-tariff barriers. For industries reliant on just-in-time logistics, such as automotive, chemicals, food, and pharmaceuticals, these frictions are the key factors that slow down investment and compel companies to rethink their operations.

The substantial benefit of a customs union lies in the removal of these institutional frictions all at once. Member states do not need to provide proof of origin, goods do not require repeated customs declarations, and borders become almost a formality. This is not an abstract system but rather a reflection of time and costs manifested daily at Dover, in warehouses, and on supply chain ledgers. The simpler the system, the higher the competitiveness.

Of course, rejoining the customs union is not without its costs: the UK would lose its independent tariff policy space and may have to restart trade negotiations with countries like Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and India with which it has already signed trade agreements. However, in terms of scale, proximity, and industrial structure, the EU remains the UK’s largest, closest, and most complementary trading partner, far outweighing any single country. Most trade agreements the UK has signed in recent years have limited economic benefits and cannot offset the long-term losses caused by the decline in trade with the EU. The costs of institutional friction accumulate daily in reality.

Labour officials are not the first to propose this route. The Liberal Democrats have long advocated that the UK should rejoin the EU customs union, while the Green Party has gone further, openly calling for rejoining the EU. These past proposals were seen as fringe voices, but they are gradually moving towards the mainstream for a simple reason: politicians are finally catching up with public opinion.

The resurgence of the customs union is not a nostalgic political move but an attempt at institutional repair. It may not be the endpoint, but it is likely the only halfway house that can materially improve the functioning of the UK economy without restarting a referendum or fully returning to the single market. Whether the UK is willing to acknowledge this is the real question worth observing.

If one were to rely solely on social media, it might seem that London is descending into chaos: rampant crime, cultural fragmentation, air pollution, and urban decay. This narrative has been repeated so often that even many Hongkongers living in the UK have begun to question whether their chosen city is indeed on a downward trajectory. However, when one removes the emotional lens and returns to the data and long-term trends, the answer becomes quite clear.

Let us first address the often exaggerated issue of crime. While London has indeed seen an increase in street thefts, particularly mobile phone snatchings, the international context paints a different picture. In 2024, London’s homicide rate is projected to be approximately 1.2 per 100,000 people, lower than that of Paris, only a third of Berlin’s, and about a quarter of New York’s. Gun crime in London is exceedingly rare. To label such a city as experiencing ‘out-of-control crime’ is not merely pessimistic; it is inaccurate.

Another popular narrative suggests that London’s multiculturalism is the ‘source of disorder.’ With a Muslim mayor, the city is often depicted as having no-go zones and veering towards extremism. Yet, research over the past decade has shown that London is one of the major Western cities with the lowest levels of ethnic segregation. People from diverse backgrounds are highly integrated in schools, communities, and workplaces, lacking the structural divides seen in Paris or some American cities. This high level of integration has, in fact, become a source of the city’s resilience.

The transformation in education illustrates this point most clearly. In the 1980s, London’s public schools were seen as symbols of failure; today, they rank among the best-performing school groups in the country. This is no coincidence, but rather a result of immigrant families’ strong commitment to education, combined with the long-term effects of institutional reforms. Diversity has not undermined London; it has reshaped it.

As for air pollution, many still cling to impressions from over a decade ago, believing London to be grey and choking. However, data indicates a structural improvement. Compared to 2016, air pollution levels in central London have decreased by approximately 65%. This is not a short-term fluctuation, but the result of years of transport and emissions policies. Today’s London boasts significantly better air quality than a decade ago, contradicting claims of it ‘getting worse.’

Another key indicator of urban functionality is transport infrastructure. Since its full opening, the Elizabeth Line has rapidly become one of the busiest and most reliable railways in the UK. It prioritizes frequency, directness, and reliability over speed, fundamentally altering the city’s sense of distance. Areas once considered too far for commuting are now naturally included within commuting ranges, expanding the recruitment scope for businesses and making residents’ lives more predictable. The success of such infrastructure is often understated, yet it profoundly impacts a city’s actual competitiveness.

This appeal is also reflected in tourism figures. London remains one of the world’s most popular tourist destinations, attracting 21 million international visitors annually in recent years. Hotels, theatres, museums, dining, and retail continue to benefit, indicating that travelers from around the globe have not been deterred by claims of ‘London in decline.’

It is against this backdrop that many Hongkongers have chosen to settle in London in recent years. This is not a romantic notion but a decision made after careful comparison. What London offers is not just job opportunities but a relatively stable, predictable, and inclusive urban structure for newcomers: the depth of education, healthcare, rule of law, and job market are all practical factors that influence life trajectories.

Of course, London’s success has not come without costs. Property prices have effectively tripled since the 1990s, making housing burdensome; the population has risen to over 9.1 million, with supply long failing to meet demand; Brexit and missteps by the central government have also slowed overall economic growth. These issues are real and warrant serious criticism. However, they describe an expensive yet successful global city, not one in disintegration.

Today, London remains a city capable of attracting talent, accommodating contradictions, and continuously renewing itself. Many Hongkongers have chosen to stay after recognizing this reality. Rather than being led by the grim narratives online, it is better to return to the data and the reality itself. The answer has always been quite clear.