Author name: 胡思

Britain is regarded as the earliest modern democracy, not primarily because it introduced elections first, but because it established a lasting system to limit power. In Britain, democracy did not initially focus on who could vote; rather, it addressed a more fundamental issue: how to constrain those in power.

This journey typically begins with the Magna Carta of 1215. At that time, King John, having suffered repeated defeats in war and facing an empty treasury, resorted to heavy taxation and arbitrary confiscation of noble properties, provoking strong backlash. Ultimately, the nobles gathered forces and compelled the king to sign the Magna Carta at Runnymede near Heathrow. This document was not a declaration of democracy, nor did it protect the rights of many, but it established a crucial principle: the king is not above the law. While democracy had not yet emerged, the constraints on power had begun to take shape.

For the next several centuries, the struggle between monarchy and parliament intensified, culminating in the English Civil War of the 17th century. Charles I insisted on the divine right of kings, bypassing parliament for taxation and governance, ultimately leading to his defeat and execution. In 1649, England abolished the monarchy and established the Commonwealth of England, which lasted until the Restoration in 1660—a period of 11 years. This republican experience was unstable, with power concentrated in the hands of Cromwell, yet it left an irreversible fact: a monarch could be tried, and sovereignty was not divinely ordained.

The true anchoring of the system came with the Glorious Revolution of 1688. James II lost the support of parliament and political elites due to his religious policies and authoritarian tendencies. Parliament invited William of Orange from the Netherlands to take over England, and James II fled abroad almost without conflict. William and Mary accepted the throne on the condition of recognizing the Bill of Rights 1689, which clearly limited royal power and safeguarded parliamentary rights in legislation, taxation, and freedom of speech. This nearly bloodless transfer of power established a core principle of modern politics: the legitimacy of government derives from parliament, not lineage.

Entering the 19th century, democracy began to shift from political structures to social dimensions. The Great Reform Act of 1832 abolished numerous corrupt constituencies, allowing emerging industrial cities and the middle class to enter the parliamentary arena. The following year, the Abolition of Slavery Act ended slavery throughout the British Empire. These two reforms acknowledged that political representation must reflect social realities while explicitly denying the legal status of individuals as property, laying the foundation for the modern concept of citizenship.

During the Victorian era, mass movements demanding universal suffrage formally emerged. Known as the Chartist movement, this political wave proposed six demands, including universal male suffrage, secret ballots, equal constituencies, the abolition of property qualifications for MPs, salaries for parliamentarians, and more frequent parliamentary elections. These demands were considered radical at the time, yet their essence was straightforward: if the law recognizes everyone as free, can politics still belong only to a minority?

Although the Chartist movement did not succeed at the time, it provided a clear blueprint for institutional reform. Over the following decades, nearly all its demands were realized, except for annual parliamentary elections. By 1918, Britain granted voting rights to some women for the first time; by 1928, electoral rights were fully equal for both genders. Only then did democracy truly transition from limiting power to widespread participation in governance.

Reflecting on this historical trajectory, Britain’s status as the first democratic nation is not due to its early enfranchisement of the populace, but rather its pioneering establishment of a functioning system of checks and balances. From the forced concessions at Runnymede to the upheaval of the 11-year republic, and finally to the Glorious Revolution affirming parliamentary sovereignty, Britain first demonstrated that democracy is a system that requires effort to achieve and maintain.

The question of whether the United Kingdom should rejoin the European Union has long been considered a political taboo, yet public sentiment is gradually eroding this invisible red line. According to the latest DeltaPoll survey, if a referendum were held today, 58% of British voters would support rejoining the EU. This result is not an isolated finding; it aligns with a long-term trend tracked by multiple organizations, indicating that support for rejoining has shifted from a controversial stance to one that commands a stable majority.

Assuming voter sentiments remain unchanged and only considering demographic shifts, the trajectory becomes quite clear. The first driving force is demographic turnover. The older generation, which tends to support Brexit, is naturally exiting the electoral register, while a new generation, which has grown up post-Brexit and views international cooperation as the norm, is continuously entering the electorate. Current research estimates that, solely due to generational replacement, support for rejoining the EU rises by approximately 0.65 percentage points each year. This is not the result of political mobilization but rather the passage of time itself.

The second driving force comes from newly naturalized citizens. Whether they are European residents with settled status who will eventually become British citizens or other long-term residents who will attain citizenship, they generally hold a more positive attitude towards the EU than the average British citizen. Even under conservative assumptions, this demographic could contribute an additional 0.1 percentage points to the support for rejoining each year. While the impact may seem limited in isolation, the consistent direction of this trend, compounded over time, is significant.

Combining these two structural factors, the ‘natural rate of increase’ for support to rejoin the EU is approximately 0.75 percentage points per year. At this pace, starting from the current level of about 58%, support for rejoining is projected to reach 60% around 2028, a direct outcome of demographic and electoral structure projections. As for surpassing two-thirds (approximately 66.7%), this is expected to occur around 2037, a clear timeline for the medium to long term.

It is important to emphasize that the above projections deliberately exclude any external shocks and merely describe what would happen ‘if nothing changes.’ However, the real world does not operate in a vacuum. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe’s understanding of security, energy, and institutional cooperation. The EU’s collective action capabilities in sanctions coordination, energy policy, and military production have been repeatedly demonstrated, while the UK increasingly appears as an outsider, gradually reshaping voters’ perceptions of the costs of Brexit.

Everyday frictions are also accumulating. Non-tariff barriers and regulatory divergences continue to emerge, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the reapplication of rules of origin, plant and animal quarantine, food safety inspections, and the lack of mutual recognition for industrial and medical product certifications and standards. These obstacles may not appear on tariff schedules, but they directly affect business costs, investment decisions, and employment patterns.

Moreover, a demonstration effect is approaching reality. Iceland is set to hold a referendum next year on whether to join the EU, and if passed, it will illustrate that remaining outside the EU is not the only viable or necessarily successful option. Once such a demonstration effect occurs, its psychological impact on British society often far exceeds the significance of the institutional details themselves.

Therefore, what truly deserves attention is not whether support for rejoining the EU will continue to rise, but whether the political system will choose to ignore this structural curve. The current 58% is not an endpoint but a snapshot of an ongoing trend. Demographic turnover provides direction, naturalization offers momentum, and geopolitical factors, non-tariff barriers, and demonstration effects will only accelerate the timeline. The only remaining question is: Is the UK prepared to confront this reality before public opinion completes its transformation?

Whenever gas prices rise, there is a common instinctive reaction in British society: if there is still gas in the North Sea, why not accelerate its extraction or even legislate that domestically produced gas can only be used in the UK? This argument sounds reasonable and politically appealing, but it overlooks the fundamental realities of how energy markets operate. In fact, even if the UK were to fully push for the redevelopment of North Sea oil and gas today, it would be difficult to have a substantial impact on energy prices.

Firstly, time itself is the greatest constraint. North Sea gas peaked in production over twenty years ago, and what remains are mostly smaller fields with complex geological conditions and high extraction costs. From licensing, exploration, financing to actual production, it often takes five to ten years. This means that new gas fields cannot respond to the current or short-term high energy prices. Energy prices are the result of immediate market conditions, while oil and gas extraction is a long-cycle industry; the two do not operate on the same timeline.

More critically, even if North Sea production increases, gas prices may not necessarily fall. UK gas is not priced based on local production costs but is fully integrated into the European market system. Once North Sea gas enters the pipeline network, it mixes with gas from Norway, continental Europe, and liquefied natural gas, trading at the same price in the same market. Gas itself has no ‘nationality’ and cannot be labeled as ‘made in the UK’. Therefore, increasing local supply does not equate to changing the pricing mechanism.

Some argue that the government could legislate to ensure that local gas is only used domestically. However, this is practically infeasible. North Sea oil and gas projects involve numerous long-term contracts and multinational investments; enforcing a ban on sales would be tantamount to unilateral default, leading to massive compensation claims and legal risks. More importantly, the UK gas system is already highly integrated with Europe, with pipelines allowing for bidirectional flow and the market balancing supply and demand in real-time. Even if legally mandated, it would be difficult to physically and market-wise ‘stop’ the flow of gas. The only viable approach would be comprehensive price controls, but the result would only be investment withdrawal and supply contraction, as history has clearly taught us.

Thus, the notion of ‘energy independence’ is often merely a political slogan. The UK’s energy issue has never been about whether there is gas, but rather about exposure to highly volatile prices. As long as gas remains an international commodity and prices are linked to the European market, the impact on household bills from shifting the source from imports to local production is quite limited. Replacing imported gas with local gas will not automatically result in cheaper energy.

Moreover, climate policies also impose structural constraints. The UK has legislated to significantly reduce fossil fuel use over the coming decades, while new oil and gas projects imply long-term capital investment and infrastructure lock-in, conflicting with decarbonization pathways. As demand gradually declines, new projects may become stranded assets, ultimately bearing risks for public finances. This is not a path to cheap energy but merely a way to postpone the problem.

In contrast, the direction that can truly make energy cheaper in the long term is already clear. The key lies in reducing dependence on gas. Enhancing home insulation can immediately reduce gas demand; once wind and solar power are established, their marginal generation costs approach zero; investments in energy storage and the grid can help stabilize price fluctuations. These measures are not idealistic concepts but have been validated as cost-control tools in multiple countries.

In summary, while redeveloping the North Sea oil fields is not without merit, it cannot address the core issue of expensive energy in the UK. Prices are not determined locally, timing cannot align, and climate risks will only intensify. Placing hope in ‘drilling a few more wells’ is merely a simplistic slogan that wraps a structural dilemma. If the goal is truly cheap and stable energy, the answer can only be to gradually reduce dependence on gas, rather than prolonging its lifespan.

In recent years, many Hongkongers have chosen to relocate to the UK, and if they do not opt for London, their attention often turns to the North Midlands of England. After some time, one name has repeatedly surfaced within the Hong Kong community: Warrington. It is neither a tourist destination nor a traditional immigrant hub, yet it has gradually evolved into a place that many Hongkongers privately refer to as ‘Hong Kong Village.’ This description is not exaggerated. According to estimates from local community organizations and media, the number of Hong Kong families settling in Warrington has reached several thousand, making them one of the most noticeable new immigrant groups in the area in recent years.

The most direct reason remains the housing prices. For most Hongkongers coming to the UK under the BN(O) visa, immigration is not a short-term stay but a long-term reconstruction of their lives. The property prices in Warrington fall into the ‘affordable yet not remote’ category. With the same budget, one might only be able to purchase a small unit in the outskirts of London or in major city centres, while here there is an opportunity to acquire a semi-detached house with three or four bedrooms, complete with amenities, providing both space and a sense of stability. For families with children, this is a very practical and easily understandable choice.

The geographical location further enhances the appeal of this choice. Warrington is situated between Manchester and Liverpool, making it neither a remote outpost nor a passive commuter town. The railway connections are well-established, and commuting times are manageable; it is also adjacent to the M6 motorway, facilitating easy travel north and south. For families needing to work across cities, conduct business, or simply avoid being tied to a single city, this offers a high degree of flexibility. More importantly, with the gradual advancement of the Northern Powerhouse Rail (NPR) integration plan, Warrington is expected to become a transport hub, providing further opportunities for enhancement in its long-term status. What Hongkongers often value is not just the present, but the overall accessibility and development prospects five or ten years down the line.

Additionally, the city’s economic structure is noteworthy; it does not rely solely on residential development. Logistics, warehousing, commercial, and professional services have long been established here, giving the city a clear role rather than being a blank slate awaiting development. For immigrants, this means that job sources will not be overly singular, and local public services are likely to be more sustainable. Consequently, immigration becomes a relatively stable arrangement for living and assets, rather than merely a one-way consumption behavior.

As the first batch of Hongkongers settled in, a community effect naturally began to form. Information started to circulate, covering everything from property purchases, school networks, and healthcare registration to daily life details, with others having paved the way and shared their experiences. When newcomers discover that ‘there are already many fellow travelers here,’ the psychological barrier significantly diminishes. Over time, choosing Warrington no longer requires much persuasion, as the lifestyle has already been validated by predecessors.

One often overlooked aspect is the pace of life. Warrington is neither noisy nor desolate; it strikes a balance between a large city and a small town. Safety, community feeling, and daily convenience are well-balanced, ensuring that life here is neither exhausting nor disconnected from mainstream society. For many Hongkongers, the true purpose of relocating to the UK is to ‘slow down life without downsizing it,’ and this place just happens to offer such conditions.

Thus, Warrington has become a ‘Hong Kong Village’ and a haven for Hong Kong migrants, not because it is particularly dazzling, but because it meets key indicators just right. Housing prices, transportation, employment, community, and quality of life are not extreme in any one aspect, yet together they form a low-risk, high-certainty landing point. As immigrants transition from political events to daily living, such cities will naturally become more visible to an increasing number of people.

In the British parliamentary system, executive power is not derived from a government separate from the legislature but is primarily drawn from the House of Commons. This fusion of executive and legislative functions is not uncommon, but the UK is characterized by a multitude of levels, broad coverage, and a high degree of politicization. To understand why the oversight function of the House of Commons often appears strained, one must first grasp the promotion and absorption ladder led by the Prime Minister.

At the base of this system is the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is typically the leader of the party or coalition that commands a majority in the House of Commons, rather than being directly elected by the public. The core of the Prime Minister’s power lies not in statutory law but in political reality: who can appoint ministers and influence career trajectories. However, the Prime Minister is not entirely unchallenged. In practice, there is usually a mechanism within the ruling party for changing the party leader, such as internal confidence votes or leadership challenges; if the government loses the confidence of the House of Commons, it may trigger a no-confidence motion. These arrangements mean that the Prime Minister must, to some extent, listen to the opinions and pressures of party MPs, or risk ending their political career at any moment.

Beneath the Prime Minister, there exists a politically symbolic position that is not always present: the Deputy Prime Minister. This position is not statutory; its establishment and the individual who occupies it are entirely dependent on the Prime Minister’s political needs. Often, the British government does not have a Deputy Prime Minister; even when one is appointed, their powers may not be clearly defined. The Deputy Prime Minister may simply serve as the Prime Minister’s political aide, balancing internal party factions, appeasing coalition partners, or presiding over certain matters in the Prime Minister’s temporary absence. In other words, the Deputy Prime Minister is not a necessary rung on the ladder of power but rather a highly flexible role that is purely a political arrangement.

The true core of the executive is comprised of Cabinet Ministers, typically numbering around twenty to twenty-three. The Cabinet is the highest decision-making circle of the government, responsible for major policy directions and inter-departmental coordination. Most of these individuals are also heads of departments, commonly referred to as Secretaries of State. Within the Cabinet, there is a clear distinction between core and secondary departments, with power not evenly distributed. Traditionally, the most significant positions include the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary, and Foreign Secretary, who often exert substantial influence on the Prime Minister regarding budget, security, foreign affairs, and national safety. Although the Cabinet theoretically operates on a principle of collective decision-making, in practical politics, the weight of these senior Cabinet Ministers is noticeably greater than that of other members.

It is important to clarify that Cabinet Ministers and heads of departments are not entirely synonymous. There are indeed a few Cabinet members who do not hold any departmental head position, such as those responsible for inter-departmental coordination or parliamentary affairs. Conversely, there are very few heads of departments who have not been invited by the Prime Minister to join the Cabinet, usually to diminish the political weight of a particular department or minister. This indicates that who can enter the Cabinet ultimately depends on the Prime Minister’s political arrangements rather than the title itself.

Next in line are Ministers of State, numbering approximately thirty to thirty-five. They are senior deputies within departments, responsible for significant but clearly defined policy areas, such as energy, immigration, or local government affairs. This tier also constitutes formal government members, required to adhere to collective responsibility and strict party discipline, serving as an important pillar of the executive system.

Following this are Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State, numbering around forty to forty-five. This is the lowest level of formal officials, yet they still belong to the government. They are responsible for more specialized policies, parliamentary responses, and technical legislative work. Politically, this often serves as the first stepping stone for backbench MPs aspiring to higher administrative positions; once they take this step, they are no longer completely free overseers.

These three tiers—heads of departments, Ministers of State, and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries—collectively comprise approximately ninety to one hundred and five MPs, forming the formal government of the UK. This alone represents a higher proportion than is typical in most mature parliamentary democracies.

The most atypical aspect of the UK system lies in an informal yet politically significant role: the Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS). There are typically around forty to fifty PPSs. They are not ministers, hold no executive power, and receive no additional remuneration, only their basic MP salary. However, in political practice, PPSs are regarded as insiders of the government, required to support government votes and prohibited from publicly opposing policies; any breach of discipline almost invariably leads to resignation. The true function of a PPS is not administrative assistance but rather a loyalty test and talent screening. This arrangement, lacking legal status yet effectively enforcing MP discipline, is quite rare in other parliamentary democracies.

When considering the entire ladder, among six hundred and fifty MPs, approximately one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty hold official positions or are tied to the government. In other words, over one-fifth of the House of Commons members are not overseeing the government but are part of it or quasi-government. It must be acknowledged that this system, which directly draws individuals from the House of Commons to form the government, does indeed bring certain practical benefits. The close integration of executive and legislative functions means that government members are themselves elected representatives, required to respond immediately in Parliament, facilitating swift policy implementation and relatively clear accountability. In situations of political stability and clear majorities, this arrangement can enhance governance efficiency and reduce the gap between executive power and public opinion.

However, the costs are equally evident and structural. When too many MPs are absorbed into the executive system, the mechanisms of oversight and checks and balances can be systematically weakened; when promotion is closely tied to loyalty, parliamentary independence can easily yield to career considerations; and the existence of informal roles like the PPS further allows executive power to expand without increasing accountability. The core issue of the system does not lie in whether MPs should hold office but in whether the depth and breadth of absorption is imbalanced. How to recalibrate between executive efficiency and parliamentary independence remains the most challenging issue that this system has long faced.