Author name: 胡思

When it comes to relocating to the UK, Hongkongers often first think of London, Manchester, or Birmingham. However, an increasing number are turning their attention to Nottingham in the East Midlands. Although it may not be widely known, it excels in practicality; it is unpretentious yet remarkably complete. Consequently, Nottingham has become a popular choice for many Hong Kong families moving to the UK in recent years.

This is not merely based on impression. According to data from the UK Home Office on BN(O) visa applications and residential distribution compiled by local governments, the East Midlands has consistently been one of the main areas for Hongkongers settling outside London, with Nottingham frequently cited as the most mentioned city. Various real estate studies also indicate that Nottingham is a medium-sized city experiencing a significant net inflow of Hongkongers. The reasons behind this are straightforward: housing prices and rents remain affordable, job and educational resources are ample, and there is a balance between living costs and urban convenience that many immigrant cities have lost.

A prime example is its public transport system. With a population of around 330,000, Nottingham boasts a mature and highly utilized tram network, which is rare in the UK. The Nottingham Express Transit is not a symbolic project; it genuinely serves a commuting function, connecting major residential areas, universities, hospitals, and the city center. For many families from Hong Kong, accustomed to public transport, this urban structure, which does not rely heavily on private cars, is inherently appealing.

Education is also a crucial pillar for Nottingham. The University of Nottingham is a member of the prestigious Russell Group, consistently ranking among the top research universities in the UK, excelling in fields such as medicine, pharmacy, engineering, life sciences, and social sciences. Another institution, Nottingham Trent University, specializes in design, business, and applied disciplines, attracting a large number of local and international students. Both universities not only bring a youthful population and international atmosphere to the city but also provide stable demand for the job and rental markets, which is particularly important for families planning to settle long-term rather than just transition temporarily.

Culturally, Nottingham is inextricably linked to Robin Hood. This legendary figure, known for robbing the rich to give to the poor, has become part of the city’s spirit: maintaining distance from power and remaining vigilant against injustice. This ethos is somewhat reflected in the city’s emphasis on public spaces and services, characterized by a lack of ostentation and a focus on pragmatism.

On a more everyday level, Nottingham also has a distinct football identity. Nottingham Forest has won the European Cup twice but has also experienced prolonged periods of decline. It is not a representative of money-driven football but rather a club supported by history, community, and loyalty, mirroring the character of the city itself. For many newcomers, this football culture, which retains local identity, makes integration easier.

Walking through Nottingham, one does not sense a desperate need for the city to prove itself. The castle overlooks the city, trams traverse the squares, and students, families, and long-time residents share a common rhythm. It lacks the oppressive atmosphere of London and the disorder found in some former industrial cities; everything appears measured and rational.

Perhaps for this reason, Nottingham rarely appears on travel lists but increasingly shows up on the relocation lists of Hong Kong immigrant families. The competition among British cities has never been about fame but rather about whether life can be sustainably established. In this regard, Nottingham provides a clear and honest answer.

When it comes to electric vehicles, the UK has long been seen as a laggard, with production capacity trailing behind China and progress lagging behind continental Europe. However, by 2026, this assessment will clearly be outdated. With several battery gigafactories either commencing or nearing production, the UK is on the verge of being able to supply batteries for hundreds of thousands of electric vehicles annually. Based on current calculations, its battery supply potential has even begun to exceed the actual annual output of the UK’s automotive sector in recent years. The question is no longer whether there will be enough batteries, but whether vehicle production capacity can keep pace.

The first pillar is the new gigafactory in Sunderland, expanded by Envision AESC, which is set to begin production around the end of 2025, with an annual capacity nearing 16 GWh. Calculating based on mainstream electric vehicles requiring approximately 60 to 80 kWh batteries each, this single factory could support around 200,000 electric vehicles (the actual figure will depend on vehicle models and battery sizes). More importantly, the power structure it relies on is already highly decarbonized. The UK’s offshore wind power ranks among the best globally, meaning that a battery produced in the UK inherently has a lower carbon footprint, which will translate into substantial competitiveness under Europe’s increasingly stringent lifecycle carbon accounting.

The second pillar is larger in scale and has more structural impact. The gigafactory being constructed by Agratas, a subsidiary of Tata Group, is designed for an annual capacity of approximately 40 GWh and is expected to commence production in 2026 or 2027. Once it enters stable mass production, this factory could theoretically supply batteries for around 250,000 to 300,000 electric vehicles, propelling the UK’s battery supply from a single project to a true scale operation.

The third tier involves medium-sized enterprises and subsequent expansions. New-generation battery manufacturers like Volklec are advancing along a path of initially small-scale production, followed by a move towards higher capacities, with a long-term goal of establishing factories at around the 10 GWh level (dependent on financing and customer orders). While this capacity may not significantly alter the total output, its significance lies in enhancing supply chain flexibility and connecting with the UK’s unique industrial translation capabilities, allowing laboratory results to avoid complete reliance on overseas mass production.

The UK’s battery landscape is also extending upstream and downstream. On the upstream side, Cornish Lithium is spearheading lithium mining and geothermal brine lithium extraction projects in Cornwall, attempting to establish a limited but strategically significant domestic lithium supply. In terms of technology, research teams represented by the University of Cambridge are at the forefront of sodium-ion battery research. Sodium is abundant and inexpensive, and while its energy density remains lower than that of lithium batteries, it offers a viable alternative route for small vehicles and energy storage, reducing dependence on a single chemical system.

Moreover, the UK’s advantages in this industry do not stem from a single segment but rather from a comprehensive combination. The highly decarbonized power structure provides a low-carbon advantage during the production phase; a robust research system ensures a continuous stream of new technologies; and industrialization platforms like the UK Battery Industrialisation Centre push laboratory results towards mass production processes, mitigating commercialization risks. Coupled with a relatively stable and predictable regulatory environment, these factors combine to enable the UK to not necessarily pursue the lowest costs, but to possess resilience in long-term competition.

When combining production capacities, the approximately 15.8 GWh from Sunderland, along with around 40 GWh from the Agratas factory, suggests that the UK could realistically approach an annual production capacity of over 50 GWh by the mid to late 2020s. Based on an average of 70 kWh per vehicle, this corresponds to a theoretical supply capacity of 700,000 electric vehicles or more annually, surpassing the actual annual output of the UK automotive sector in recent years. In terms of quantity, batteries are shifting from being a constraint to becoming a prerequisite.

For this reason, the next steps in policy are quite clear. Currently, UK-manufactured cars exported to the EU still face around a 10% tariff, but this is not an immutable fate; rather, it is a result of ongoing negotiation space. If the UK wishes to truly convert its battery advantages into manufacturing scale, exports, and jobs, there is ample reason to reach a more pragmatic arrangement with the EU as soon as possible. Otherwise, while batteries are already ahead, the entire industry may find itself stuck at the border.

The current system used by the UK House of Commons is the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system. In each constituency, only one representative is elected, with the candidate receiving the most votes declared the winner, regardless of whether they achieve a majority. While this system appears straightforward, it is predicated on a harsh reality: it only acknowledges the first-place candidate, rendering all other votes, regardless of their margins, ineffective in translating into any parliamentary seats.

Under this system, the efficacy of votes is not uniform. If a voter’s preferred candidate consistently ranks third, fourth, or lower in their constituency, their votes are unlikely to alter the outcome or influence the distribution of power in Parliament. This is not a negation of voter intent but rather a consequence of the operational mechanics of the system. Whether a vote is deemed ‘effective’ hinges solely on its ability to change the identity of the first-place candidate.

Consequently, although ballots often list multiple candidates, creating an illusion of ample choice, in reality, only two candidates typically matter. Elections do not involve a fair competition among several options but rather a contest between the two candidates with the highest chances of winning. The presence of other names serves more as a symbol or diversion, having limited impact on the final result.

This also explains why voting is practically compelled to transform into a strategic choice. When the outcome is determined solely between two individuals, voters’ considerations shift from ‘whom do I prefer?’ to ‘who is likely to win?’ and ‘do I want that person to win?’ Thus, voting may not necessarily express support; it can also signify clear opposition.

If you are certain you do not want a particular candidate to win, the most effective strategy is often not to vote for the candidate whose views align most closely with yours but rather to deliberately vote for their main opponent, even if that person is not your first choice. This form of strategic voting may seem disingenuous, but it merely acknowledges that the system counts only wins and losses, not motivations.

The challenge lies in the fact that this calculation heavily relies on information. In constituencies with highly fragmented parties and multiple contenders, who the ‘top two’ candidates are may not be clear. Insufficient polling, variations in local mobilization, and last-minute changes can all lead to misjudgments. The system forces voters to engage in precise calculations, yet it may not provide sufficient reliable clues.

From a design perspective, proportional representation clearly better reflects the true will of the electorate. Under such a system, voters can confidently support the parties or candidates they genuinely endorse, as every vote translates proportionally into seats, eliminating the need to guess who might win or who could block whom. Voting becomes an expression of preference rather than a game of strategy. Unfortunately, systemic change is not immediate; for the foreseeable future, the UK must continue to operate under the First Past the Post system.

Understanding this is not an encouragement of cynicism but rather a call to avoid naivety. Under the current system, the power of a vote lies not in what you wish to express but in where you place your vote. You can cast a vote in favor or against; however, if you refuse to calculate, you will ultimately be calculated for by the system.

Brexit is often framed as an opportunity to streamline government and reduce regulation, yet the reality has been quite the opposite. Since the referendum in 2016, the number of full-time equivalent civil servants in the UK central government has risen from approximately 380,000 to over 510,000, an increase of more than 130,000. Multiple research institutions have pointed out that, after accounting for the pandemic, around 100,000 of these positions are directly or indirectly related to the new systems, border controls, regulations, and negotiations that emerged post-Brexit. This is not a result of improved administrative efficiency, but rather a structural cost incurred from exiting a common system that necessitates compensatory staffing.

The issue is not merely one of having more personnel; it is that this influx represents a permanent increase in ongoing expenditure. When calculating the total cost of civil servants, one must consider not only salaries but also employer national insurance contributions, pension liabilities, office rentals, IT systems, cybersecurity, training, and management costs. Even under conservative assumptions, the annual cost per civil servant is estimated to be between £50,000 and £60,000. If we consider the 100,000 staff related to Brexit, the additional ongoing expenditure reaches £5 billion to £6 billion per year, and this is not a one-off cost but rather a recurring burden embedded in government spending.

One of the most expensive and difficult-to-reverse areas is border control and immigration. Prior to Brexit, the UK did not require complete third-country checks on goods and people from the EU; post-Brexit, customs declarations, rules of origin, plant and animal health inspections, border IT systems, port infrastructure, and additional border and immigration officials have all become the norm. The Home Office and HM Revenue and Customs have maintained high staffing levels to manage the new visa system, residency approvals, customs clearance, and compliance enforcement. These costs are reflected not only in salaries but also in the expensive construction and maintenance of border systems, making this one of the heaviest burdens on public finances post-Brexit.

Another underestimated source of expenditure is the regulation of food, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture. Previously centralized by the EU, food safety assessments, drug approvals, agricultural subsidies, and environmental compliance have all returned to domestic management post-Brexit. In the pharmaceutical sector, the UK must establish parallel approval and regulatory capabilities to the EU, which, even if the outcomes often align, still requires a complete set of independent personnel and procedures. The same applies to food and agriculture, where health inspections, subsidy management, standard-setting, and enforcement demand additional long-term human resources. These tasks are not an expansion of policy choices but rather an unavoidable duplication resulting from institutional fragmentation.

In addition, there are layers of Brexit-related expenditures that are less frequently mentioned but equally resource-intensive. Legally, a significant number of regulations that were previously EU-based need to be transposed, amended, and maintained over the long term, requiring specialized legal and policy personnel. In trade, the UK must independently maintain rules of origin verification, trade remedies, subsidy regulation, and dispute resolution mechanisms, even if actual cases are few; the system itself must still exist in its entirety. Furthermore, the government must continue to provide businesses with guidance on Brexit compliance, support hotlines, and transitional arrangements. These seemingly scattered tasks cumulatively represent a long-term burden on both human resources and finances.

When these expenditures are distributed at the household level, the picture becomes clearer. With approximately 27 million households in the UK, the annual Brexit-related personnel expenditure of £5.5 billion translates to about £200 per household each year. This amount will not appear on tax bills as a ‘Brexit cost’; instead, it will be absorbed indirectly through tax pressure, dilution of public service resources, or the squeezing of other budget items.

It is noteworthy that the government often attributes the rise in civil servant numbers to the pandemic while downplaying the long-term impact of Brexit. The pandemic has led to a temporary spike, which theoretically can recede; however, the effects of Brexit are permanent and recurring. As long as the UK chooses to operate independently in institutional terms, it will require more personnel and financial resources in the long term to accomplish tasks that could have been shared within a common system.

Whether Brexit was worth it remains a matter of political division; however, from an administrative and financial perspective, the accounts are quite clear. Approximately 100,000 new civil servants and billions of pounds in annual ongoing expenditure ultimately fall on every household. This may not be the most prominent page in the Brexit narrative, but it is likely the most enduring and hardest to ignore.