The primary issue with local governance in England is not the incompetence of local authorities, but rather that they are institutionally designed to fail. Power and resources are highly concentrated in Westminster, leaving local governments with responsibilities but no corresponding control. Over time, this systemic flaw has become evident.
One of the fundamental limitations of local councils is that they bear significant statutory responsibilities without having control over the relevant resources. Social welfare, adult care, children’s services, and special educational needs are all mandated by law, and demand continues to rise with an aging population and social changes. However, local governments lack sufficient financial tools to respond, relying instead on central government funding settlements, which have tightened over the past two decades. Consequently, local authorities are forced to ‘rob Peter to pay Paul’ among statutory services, sacrificing long-term beneficial investments—such as in transport, culture, and economic development—first.
In 2004, the Labour government attempted to establish a regional assembly in the North East of England, marking the first elected regional government in England. However, it was rejected in a referendum by nearly 78% of voters. This failure is often oversimplified as ‘the English do not want local autonomy,’ but the more direct reason was that the assembly lacked real power and stable financial sources while seeking to replace existing county councils. Voters saw no tangible benefits, only an additional layer of political structure, and their rejection was unsurprising.
Subsequently, the UK shifted towards promoting combined authorities, merging multiple local governments into larger administrative units with some functions delegated by the central government, along with elected mayors. While this arrangement appears pragmatic, it still fails to address the core power structure.
For instance, the North East is currently covered by two combined authorities: the North East Combined Authority and the Tees Valley Combined Authority. On the surface, they are no different from the regional assembly that was rejected years ago; the problem remains that they are merely administrative arrangements, not political entities. They lack their own councils, independent legislative powers, and stable, predictable financial foundations.
Even more perplexing is their decision-making mechanism. Major decisions within a combined authority often require repeated negotiations between elected mayors and leaders of all member local councils. If consensus cannot be reached, decision-making stagnates. This is neither parliamentary democracy nor a single executive leadership system, but rather a highly consultative, low-accountability hybrid. When policy failures occur, voters find it difficult to determine whom to hold accountable.
London is one of the few exceptions. In addition to having a mayor, London also has the London Assembly, which provides scrutiny, oversight, and public debate, at least forming a basic structure for democratic checks and balances. However, this system has not been replicated in other regions of England.
Another structural issue is that local and regional governments must continually ‘bid’ to Westminster. Whether for transport, housing, skills training, or urban renewal, local authorities must draft proposals to compete for centrally-led funding, akin to participating in a beauty pageant, catering to the policy preferences of the current minister. Resource allocation is not based on local long-term needs but rather on the central government’s current political priorities.
If local authorities truly controlled their resources, the issues could be much simpler. They could independently determine budget allocations, balancing transport, education, public health, and economic development, rather than passively executing Whitehall’s directives. The essence of local politics should be about trade-offs and accountability, not incessantly writing bids and awaiting approvals.
Therefore, the truly reasonable direction for reform is not to further patch up combined authorities but to complete the long-overdue constitutional arrangements in England. By establishing eight new regional assemblies along existing English regional boundaries, these would be placed on an institutional level equivalent to London, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Clearly defining their legislative powers, financial rights, and areas of responsibility would allow for the devolution of both resources and power.
This is not radical reform but rather institutional catch-up. Only when England finally possesses a political structure commensurate with its scale can local governance truly mature, allowing Westminster to disengage from the minutiae of local affairs. The problem in England has never been that localities are incapable, but rather that the central government exerts too much control and detail.
