As conflict spreads across the Middle East, Brent crude has risen from around $60 a barrel to about $76, an increase of more than 25%. Some analysts warn that if tensions escalate further, prices could approach $100. Natural gas prices have also jumped sharply, with European futures rising by more than 30% in a short period. Oil and gas are moving together. Markets are repricing geopolitical risk. When the risk premium rises, transport costs rise, generation costs rise, and electricity bills follow.
The impact of gas prices on electricity markets is particularly direct. In Britain and much of Europe, wholesale power prices are set by the marginal plant — often a gas-fired station. When gas prices spike, electricity prices are pushed up, even if the cost of wind and solar remains unchanged. This mechanism was brutally clear during the 2022 energy crisis. Today’s oil and gas surge is a reminder that the structure has not fundamentally changed.
In this context, some critics argue that net zero policies and renewable expansion are to blame for high electricity prices. They claim that the energy transition is the culprit. This diagnosis is wrong. The immediate cause of rising prices is geopolitical instability and supply risk, not the development of wind and solar. The real question is not whether the transition exists, but whether conditions would be worse without it.
This is where counterfactual analysis becomes essential. A counterfactual is not a simple comparison between now and the past, nor is it a crude comparison between one country and another. It asks us to compare two possible worlds. In one world, over the past decade, we invested heavily in wind and solar and reduced dependence on fossil fuels. In the other, we did not. The relevant question is not why prices are rising despite renewables, but whether prices would be even higher without them.
Research from University College London has shown that the expansion of wind power in the UK has reduced wholesale electricity prices and saved consumers billions of pounds over recent years. During periods of high gas prices, wind generation has acted as a buffer. Without that additional wind capacity, electricity bills and government support costs would have been significantly higher. That is what a proper counterfactual comparison reveals.
Climate sceptics focus on the fact that prices are high even with renewables. But they fail to ask whether the shock would have been larger without them. Global fossil fuel supply remains concentrated in regions dominated by authoritarian regimes. Price risk and political risk are intertwined. Dependence on those supplies is itself a structural vulnerability.
Energy policy is ultimately about risk management. Wind and sunlight are domestic resources. They are not subject to embargoes, sanctions, or conflict. Building renewable capacity requires capital investment, but once installed, marginal costs are close to zero. Fossil fuels, by contrast, require continuous purchases at prices determined by global markets and geopolitical tensions. This is not an ideological debate. It is about exposure to volatility.
If oil prices do approach $100 again, the lesson will not be that the transition has gone too far. It will be that we have not gone far enough. The problem is not transition. It is overdependence on fossil fuels. Every surge in oil and gas prices is a reminder that energy security and price stability depend on accelerating the shift toward locally produced renewable energy, rather than remaining primarily reliant on fossil fuels produced in politically unstable parts of the world.
Gemini:
While the article makes several data-backed points, it contains several logical fallacies and rhetorical leans that are common in persuasive writing. Here is an analysis of the logical fallacies and structural biases present:
1. The False Dilemma (Either/Or Fallacy)
The article concludes by stating: “The lesson will not be that the transition has gone too far. It will be that we have not gone far enough.”
The Flaw: This presents a binary choice: either the transition is the problem, or the lack of it is the problem. It excludes a “middle ground” or alternative factors, such as the possibility that the method or speed of the transition might be inefficient, or that global energy demand is outstripping the current technical capabilities of storage for renewables.
2. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc (False Cause)
The text argues that because high electricity prices coincide with gas price spikes, the solution is purely more renewables.
The Flaw: While gas prices do set the marginal price in many markets (as the article correctly notes), the author implies that “not moving fast enough” is the sole reason for current vulnerability. It overlooks the fact that a rapid transition can sometimes lead to higher short-term costs or grid instability, which are separate issues from gas prices but contribute to the overall price the consumer pays.
3. Confirmation Bias / Cherry Picking
The author cites research from University College London stating that wind power saved consumers billions.
The Flaw: While this may be true during specific periods of high gas prices, the article omits the “system costs” associated with renewables—such as the massive investment needed for grid upgrades, backup capacity (like batteries or gas plants on standby), and the costs of curtailment (paying wind farms to turn off when there is too much power). By focusing only on the savings during price spikes, the author presents an incomplete economic picture.
4. Straw Man Fallacy
The article states: “Climate sceptics focus on the fact that prices are high even with renewables. But they fail to ask whether the shock would have been larger without them.”
The Flaw: The author characterizes the opposition as “climate sceptics” and simplifies their argument to a single point. In reality, many critics of current energy policies are not climate skeptics but rather “energy realists” or economists who argue about the intermittency of renewables or the inflationary nature of rapid decarbonization. By labeling all critics as “sceptics,” the author makes the opposing view easier to dismiss.
5. Appeal to Counterfactuals (Hypothesis Contrary to Fact)
A large portion of the argument relies on a “counterfactual analysis”—comparing the current world to an imaginary one where we moved faster.
The Flaw: While counterfactuals are a useful academic tool, they cannot be proven. The author asserts that in a world where we moved faster, prices would be lower. This ignores potential negative outcomes of that imaginary scenario, such as higher debt, resource shortages for battery minerals, or earlier economic shocks caused by retiring coal/gas plants too soon. It treats a theoretical scenario as a definitive proof.
6. Special Pleading (Double Standard on Risk)
The author notes that fossil fuels are subject to “geopolitical tensions” and “authoritarian regimes,” while claiming wind and sunlight are “domestic resources… not subject to embargoes.”
The Flaw: While the wind isn’t subject to an embargo, the infrastructure to capture it (turbines, solar panels, magnets, batteries) is heavily dependent on global supply chains often dominated by the same “authoritarian regimes” or geopolitically sensitive regions (e.g., China’s dominance in rare earth elements and solar manufacturing). The author highlights the geopolitical risk of oil but ignores the geopolitical risk of the green technology supply chain.
Thank you for the detailed response. However, several of the criticisms misunderstand the argument made in the article.
First, regarding the alleged “false dilemma.” The article does not claim there are only two possible explanations for high prices. It simply argues that when fossil fuels continue to set the marginal electricity price, dependence on them exposes the system to global shocks. Saying that we have not moved far enough in reducing that dependence is not a binary argument. It is a statement about structural exposure to volatility.
Second, on the claim of “false cause.” The article explicitly explains the pricing mechanism in European electricity markets: gas often sets the marginal price. When gas prices rise, electricity prices follow. That mechanism is widely documented. The argument is therefore not that renewables automatically lower prices in every situation, but that reducing the role of gas in price formation reduces exposure to gas price shocks.
Third, on “cherry picking.” System costs such as grid investment, balancing capacity, and curtailment are real and widely discussed in energy economics. But fossil fuel systems also carry system costs that are often overlooked, including fuel price volatility, geopolitical risk premiums, and the need for continuous fuel purchases. The relevant comparison is not whether renewables have costs. It is which system exposes consumers to greater long-term risk.
Fourth, on the alleged straw man. The article uses the term “climate sceptics” loosely to describe a group of commentators who frequently attribute high electricity prices to the energy transition itself. It does not claim that all critics of energy policy hold identical views, nor does the argument depend on that label.
Fifth, on counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual reasoning is standard in policy evaluation. Economists routinely estimate what prices, emissions, or output would have been under different investment paths. Such analysis does not claim certainty. It simply provides the best available estimate of policy impact, which is exactly what studies on wind expansion in the UK attempt to do.
Finally, on supply chains. It is true that renewable technologies rely on global manufacturing and mineral supply chains. However, this is fundamentally different from the ongoing dependence on fossil fuels. Turbines and panels require upfront manufacturing inputs, but once installed they generate energy for decades without continuous fuel imports. Fossil fuel systems, by contrast, require constant exposure to global commodity markets.
In short, the article’s central point is about risk structure. A system heavily dependent on globally traded fuels will always transmit geopolitical shocks into energy prices. Expanding domestic renewable generation does not eliminate every cost or constraint, but it does reduce that structural exposure.